Suability of Unions by Lester, Virgil T.
SMU Law Review




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Virgil T. Lester, Suability of Unions, 2 Sw L.J. 246 (1948)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol2/iss1/16
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SUABILITY OF UNIONSO RGANIZED labor has made tremendous advances in the past
half century so that today labor unions wield vast power
over the national economy. Unrestrained power could well present
an intolerable situation, and it is certainly desirable, if not im-
perative, that unions be subject to judicial process. In the past
there has been disagreement and lack of understanding concerning
the suability of a labor union. The misconception has been har.
bored that such an organization could not be sued. Where this
impression has not prevailed, there has been disagreement with
respect to the proper procedure involved in suing a labor union.
The purpose of this article is to consider and to clarify the legal
status of unions in the courts. The emphasis will be on procedures
whereby a union may be made defendant in a civil suit at law
or in equity.
I.
From earliest times the vast majority of labor unions as-
sumed the form of unincorporated associations. As such they had
no standing in the courts; they were not natural persons, and they
did not meet the statutory requirements of duly chartered cor-
porations. The only way in which a union could sue or be sued
was to have all members joined as parties This was, and to an
extent still is, the common-law rule.
Manifestly, a requirement that all members be joined in a civil
action affecting the union is cumbersome and leads to frustration
of judicial process. Even when members were few, the require-
1 Baskins v. United Mine Workers, 150 Ark. 398, 234 S. W. 464 (1921) ; Smith v.
I. L. G. W. V., 58 Ga. App. 26, 197 S. W. 349 (1938) ; Tyler v. Boot and Shoe Workers
Union, 285 Mass. 54, 188 N. E. 509 (1933) ; Picket v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572. 78 N. E. 753
(1906); See GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 380-385 (1946). But see Newark Inter-
national Baseball Club, Inc. v. M. A. and T. V., 125 N. J. Eq. 575, 7 A. (2d) 170, 172
(1939). The following is there stated: "Independently of statute, chancery has long
assumed jurisdiction of suits against labor unions by their own common name."
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ment was burdensome and difficult to meet. In the present day,
when union membership is greatly increased, the requirement
would he an insuperable obstacle to judicial settlement of labor
controversies.
Fortunately, equity at an early date recognized the inadequacy
of the procedures at law and developed the class action.! This
type of action permits service upon a small number of union mem-
bers as representative of the entire membership. The necessary
elements in a class suit are: (1) a class of persons so large that
joinder of all would be impossible;3 (2) service upon and joinder
of a group of members or officers who fairly represent the inter-
ests of the class;' and (3) common interest of the entire mem-
bership in the subject matter of the suit.' If a class suit is properly
brought and judgment obtained, execution may issue against the
funds and property of the union.6 Of course, the property of mem-
bers who were not served and brought into court cannot be reached
to pay the judgment. To subject their property to the levy would
be a violation of due process!
The class action met a need severly felt in disputes between
labor and management. The remedy, however, was not widely used
either because it was not well known or because difficulties were
encountered in fulfilling the procedural requirements. Perhaps
the infrequency of resort to the class action was a result of the
general opinion that unions were not amenable to suit.
2 Carpenters Union v. Citizens Committee, 333 111. 225, 164 N. E. 393 (1928) ; see
Witmer, Trade Union Liability; The Problem of Unincorporated Corporation, 51 YALE
L. J. 40 (1942).
3 Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Iss, 237 U. S. 662 (1915).
4 Am. Steel and Wire Co. v. Wire Drawer's & Die Makers Union, 90 Fed. 598 (C. C.
N. D. Ohio 1898).
5 lbid; Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Iss, 237 U. S. 662 (1915).
6 Mausch v. Order of Americus, 223 Pa. 199, 72 At. 528 (1909) ; Oster v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Fireman & Enginemen, 271 Pa. 419, 114 Atl. 377 (1921). The latter case
involved a suit in equity to recover on a life insurance certificate issued by a fraternal
benefit association.
7 Brady v. Mutual Benefit Dept. Order of Ry. Conductors, 215 Ky. 177, 283 S. W. 1045
(1926) ; Maguire v. Reough, 238 Mass. 98, 130 N. E. 270 (1920) ; Malloy v. Carroll, 287
Mass. 376, 191 N. E. 661 (1934) ; O'Neal v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 216 Mo.
App. 212, 261 S. W. 128 (1924) (no individual liability unless so contracted).
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Other doctrines have been utilized to subject unions to legal
process. A union which has engaged in business as an entity in
insuring its members has been estopped, in an action on the in-
surance certificate, to deny it was a suable legal entity. s In other
cases the suability of a union has been regarded as a question of
procedure rather than a question of substantial law. Accordingly,
failure to object to suit in the association name is a waiver of
error, and the defect cannot be raised for the first time on appeal'
It is apparent that neither estoppel nor waiver are reliable doc-
trines on which a plaintiff may depend in his suit against a union.
Estoppel has-been utilized in special situations, and unions can-
not be expected to waive defects in procedures which may lead to
civil liability.
Still another basis for suability of unions is the recognition
given them as legal entities in modern legislation.' Recognition
of unions as legal entities for particular purposes tends to lead
to their recognition as such for the purposes of suit. This ten-
dency, however, is not uniform throughout the states and should
not be relied upon by a plaintiff who seeks to a sue a union.
II.
The uncertainty of the status of labor unions in the courts has
existed from the inception of such unincorporated associations in
the United States. One might expect that remedial legislation
would be fast in coming, but the contrary was the fact. The com-
mon-law rule still prevails in many states."1 In other words, all
8 Clark v. G. L. B. R. T., 328 Mo. 1084, 43 S. W. (2d) 404 (1931) ; Varnado v. Whit-
ney, 166 Miss. 663, 147 So. 479 (1933); Winchester v. G. L. R. B., 203 N. C. 735, 167
S. E. 49 (1932).
9 Operative Plasterer's Assn. v. Case, 93 F. (2d) 56 (C. C. A. 4th 1937) ; Iron Molders
Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 9th 1908); Barnes v. Chicago Typo-
graphical Union, 23 Ill. 402, 83 N. E. 932 (1908) ; U. M. W. v. Cromer, 159 Ky. 605,
167 S. W. 891 (1914).
10 United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922) ; Nissen v. Inter-
national Brotherhood, 199 Iowa 1028, 295 N. W. 858 (1941) ; Labonite v. Cannery Work-
ers and Farm Laborer's Union, 197 Wash. 543, 86 P. (2d) 189 (1938).
11 Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co. v. Local Union No. 2928, 152 F. (2d) 493 (C. C. A.
7th 1945) ; Becker v. Caliman, 313 Mass. 625, 48 N. E. (2d) 688 (1943).
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members must be joined as parties in a suit involving the union,
or a class action must be brought.
Most states today have statutes which permit suit by or against
a union or unincorporated association in the common name."
While these enactments do not obviate all difficulties, they at least
ease the initial problem of how and whom to sue.
An exhaustive analysis of the various state statutes will not
be attempted here, but a general indication may be made as to
their provisions. Some statutes provide that members of the union
or certain officers and agents of the union may be served as repre-
sentative of the union."' Other statutes permit suit in the associa-
tion name, service being made upon designated individuals." Gen-
erally, after the case has proceeded to judgment, the joint funds
and property of the union may be levied upon to satisfy the plain-
tiff's claim.' The individual property of members served may
also be reached."
In Texas an unincorporated association may be sued in the
common name by service upon "the president, secretary, treas-
urer, or general agent."" But where such service is had, any judg-
ment obtained is binding on the joint property only. Service may
be had on individual members as well, and the judgment may be
enforced against them individually after the joint property has
been exhausted. It is specially provided that "execution shall
not issue against the individual property of the ... members until
execution against the joint property has been returned without
satisfaction."1"
12 Collected citation to these statutes may be found in 2 Tru.ux., THE LAW GoVERNING
LaER Dtisuis AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, § 465 (1940).
18 IND. ANN. STAT. § 277 (Burns 1926) ; NEV. REV. LAWS 1912, § 5001.
14 CALIF. CODE Cry. PRo. (1873 as amended 1907) § 388; MONTANA REV. CODE 1921,
§ 9089; "lx. ANN.REV. CIV. STAT. (Vernon 1925) art. 6134.
15 Ariz. Laws, 1947, c. 81, § i Fla. Laws, 1943, c. 21968, § 11; Kan. Laws, 1943, S. B.
264, § 10; La. Laws, 1946, Act. No. 180, § 3(a) ; Nebr. Laws, 1947, S. B. 225, § 1.
16 Del. Laws, 1947, H. B. 212, § 8.
2, Tax. ANN. REv. CIV. STAT. (Vernon 1925) art. 6133,6134.




The federal courts have been among the first to subject labor
unions to judicial process. In the Danbury Hatters case" a suit
for treble damages resulting from interstate boycott was sus-
tained under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. In that case officers and
members of the offending union were joined as defendants, and
both joint and individual property were made subject to the judg-
ment. While the union was not recognized as a legal entity in
this case, the results were as satisfactory to the plaintiff as if full
recognition had been given.
The landmark Coronado" case established that unions were
entities that could be sued at least where the cause of action was
based on a federal substantive right. The United States Supreme
Court stated:
"Equitable procedure adapting itself to modern needs has grown
to recognize the need of representation by one person of many, too
numerous to sue or to be sued,... so that, out of the very necessities
of the existing conditions and the utter impossibility of doing justice
otherwise, the suable character of such organizations as labor unions
has come to be recognized ...-"
The court observed that unincorporated labor unions have been
recognized as entities for various legislative purposes and con-
cluded that such associations should be suable in the common
name, process being served upon their principal officers. The
opinion of the Court showed a reliance upon the concept of the
equitable class suit, the doctrine of necessity, and the recognition
of unions as entities expressed or implied in social and economic
legislation. It is to be noted however that the Coronado case was
not generally followed in the state courts."2
19 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1908), 235 U. S. 522 (1915).
20 United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922) ; 2 MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE J 17.17 (1938).
21259 U. S. 344, 387 (1922).
22 The following cases refused to follow the Coronado case. Dist. No. 21, United Mine
Workers v. Bourland, 169 Ark. 796, 277 S. W. 546 (1926) ; Walker v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers, 186 Ga. 811, 199 S. E. 146 (1938) ; Gahill v. Plumbers, Gas and
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The new Federal Rules of Procedure, " effective in 1938, have
taken cognizance of and accepted the doctrine of the Coronado
case. Rules 4(d) (3), 4(d) (7), and 17(b) provide that an un-
incorporated association may be sued in its common name, process
being served upon an officer, managing or general agent, or any
other agent authorized by appointment or law (federal or state)
to receive service.
The recently enacted Labor Management Relations Act' (also
known as the Taft-Hartley Act) is positive in its provisions for
suit against unions. Sections 301 (a) declares:
"Suits for violation of contract between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting com-
merce ... , or between such labor organizations may he brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without re-
gard to the citizenship of the parties."
Section 301(b) states that any labor organization "may sue o
be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it rep-
resents," and Section 301 (d) provides that service of legal process
"upon an officer or agent of a labor organization, in his capacity
as such, shall constitute service upon the labor organization. 25
According to Section 301(b)
"... any money judgment against a labor organization in a district
court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the or-
ganization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be en-
forceable against any individual member or his assets."
The plain wording of Section 301 limits its application to actions
Steam Fitters & Helpers Local 193, 238 111. App. 123 (1925) ; Tyler v. Boot and Shoe
Workers Union, 285 Mass. 54. 188 N. E. 509 (1933); Grant v. Carpenters Dist. Council,
322 Pa. 62, 185 At. 273 (1936) ; West v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 103 W. Va. 417, 137
S. E. 654 (1927). But see federal cases following the Coronado case. Moffat Tunnel
League v. United States, 289 U. S. 113 (1933) ; Levering & Carrigues Co. v. Morrin, 61 F.
(2d) 945 (1934).
:' 28 U. S. C. § 723 (c) (1940) ; see I MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 4.20 (1938).
24 61 STAT. 136 (1947) ; 29 U. S. C. A. § 141-147 (Supp. 1947).
25 Section 301 (c) places venue (1) in the district inwhich the organization maintains
its principal office, or (2) in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents.
are engaged in representing or acting for employee members.
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for breach of contract. Since the rule prevailing in the federal
courts has permitted suit against a union in its common name,
one may ask what the statute has accomplished? The answer is
that diversity of citizenship and minimum amount in controversy
are no longer requirements for action, and an employer in an in-
dustry affecting commerce has a new and expanded remedy in the
federal courts which may not be available in the state courts. The
limitation on the enforceability of the judgment is to be specially
noted. The congressional intent was to exempt the property of in-
dividual members of the union. "Thus the members ... secure all
the advantages of limited liability without incorporation of the
union."" It is also to be noted that Section 301 apparently deals
only with actions for damages. The section does not relieve a
plaintiff from the requirements of the Norris-LaGuardia Act if
injunction is sought.
A subsequent section provides for union liability for boycotts
carried on for enumerated illegal purposes. Section 303(a) de-
clares that it is unlawful "for the purposes of this section only
in an industry or activity affecting commerce for any labor or-
ganization to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees
of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal ...
to use, manfacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work
on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform
any services, where an object therein is . .. " (1) to compel an em-
ployer to cease dealing with any other person, (2) to compel any
other employer to bargain collectively with a union not yet cer-
tified as the representative of his employees, (3) to compel any
employer to bargain with a union other than that which has been
certified as the representative of his employees, or (4) to compel
an employer to assign work to a particular union (unless the em-
ployer is failing to comply with an order or certification of the
National Labor Relations Board). Section 303(b) authorizes suit
in a federal district court for damages by anyone injured in his
26 SEN. RE. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess, 15-18 (1947).
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business or property by reason of violation of subsection (a), and
the procedural provisions and limitations of Section 301 (relating
to suit for breach of contract) are made applicable. Section 303
is to be distinguished from Section 301, the former section creates
a statutory liability in damages for the tort of boycott in interstate
commerce.
Amenability of labor unions to suit in federal courts has pro.
gressed from the old common-law rule of non-recognition to the
present status of suability in the common name. It is to be hoped
that future legislation and decisions will leave no ambiguities
in regard to the status, responsibilities and benefits which will
attach to such organizations in the federal courts.
IV.
Assuming that a union is amenable to suit, practical difficulties
stand in the way of recovering and realizing upon a judgment for
damage. One of the most serious of these is the question of
agency.
It is said that a union is liable for the acts of its officers and
members according to the common law principles of agency. If an
act is expressly or impliedly authorized, or within the apparent
authority of the actor, or ratified, liability follows. Proof that par-
ticular acts of violence or trespass were actually or apparently
authorized or ratified by the union membership or by its respon-
sible leadership is hard to obtain. One can well imagine the dif-
ficulty of proving that a random act of violence to person or prop-
erty during a strike, participated in by hundreds, was the auth-
orized or ratified act of an agent of the union. The probability.
of such agency being found may very likely depend upon the
consequent liability iriposed. If the members are individually
liable, then it may be expected that the courts will be more reluc-
tant to find agency, while if only the association property is liable,
then perhaps agency will be more readily found.
Congress apparently felt that the common-law doctrine of
agency was not sufficiently favorable to unions in the federal
1948]
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courts, for the Norris-LaGuardia Act," passed in 1932, included
a section further restricting liability. Section 6 of that Act de
clared:
"No officer or member of any association or organization, and no
association or organization ... shall be held responsible or liable...
for unlawful acts of individual officers, members or agents, except
upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization
of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge
thereof."
This section removed the danger that a union or its officers or
members would be liable for tortious acts which were apparently
authorized or which might be found to be generally within the
scope of activity of a union agent. A recent Supreme Court case"
indicates that Section 6 means exactly this and that a union, its
officers and members can be held liable for torts only on strict
proof of actual authorization or ratification of the acts of the tort-
feasor.
Under the Labor Management Relations Act the common-law
doctrine has been re-established. Section 301 states that for the
purposes of this section "in determining whether any person is
acting as an agent of another person . . ., whether the specific acts
performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified, shall
not be controlling."'" An employer who sues for breach of contract
under Section 301 or for damages caused by boycott under Section
303 may rely on the orthodox principles of the law of agency.
The question of responsibility of a union for a "wildcat strike"
occurring during the life of a collective contract is related to the
problem of agency. The first inquiry is whether, on a sound con-
struction of the contract, the union undertakes that there will be
27 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 101-115 (1932).
2 United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners v. United States, 330 U. S. 395
(1947) (three justices dissenting).
29 THE BuREAu OF NATIONAL AFFAIRs, THE NEW LABOR LAw, E(3)36, quotes Sen.
ator Taft, the co-author, as saying in congressional debates: "I think the word 'agent' ...
means an agent under the ordinary rules of agency, an agent of the labor union, the
organization, as such. The fact that a man was a member of a labor union in my opinion
would be no evidence whatever to show that he was an agent."
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no concerted disruption of work. If so, the union should be liable
on its contract. If not, the next inquiry is whether the persons par-
ticipating in or directing the "wildcat strike" were agents of the
union. If they were, the union would seem to be liable.
The recent American-Hawaiian Steamship Co. case"0 indicates
that liability for a "wildcat strike" may be difficult to sustain. The
action was brought by the Steamship Co. for breach of contract
in delaying the sailing of one of its vessels. The contract stipu-
lated that there would be no stoppages and that the union would
furnish a crew. The crew walked off the ship upon a failure to
comply with their demand for higher wages. The court exonerated
the union from liability stating that the union could not compel
the crew to work but merely point out available positions. This
construction of the contract apparently secured to the Steamship
Co. only the assurance that the union would attempt, in good
faith, to comply with the contract.
A recent Texas statute3' expressly declares that both unions and
management should be responsible for the fulfillment of their con-
tracts. Section 1 of the statute is as follows:
"A labor organization whose members picket or strike against any
person, firm or corporation shall be liable in damages for any loss
resulting to such person, firm or corporation by reason-of such picket-
ing or strike in the event that such picketing or strike is held to be
a breach of contract by a court of competent jurisdiction."
This language clearly recognizes unions as entities which are
subject to suit.
One may question that this statute expresses strict liability for
"wildcat strikes." The caption and preamble may be looked to
for a further indication of the legislative intent. Plausible argu-
ments may be advanced both for and against strict union liability.
30 American-Hawaiian S. S. Co. v. Sailors Union of the Pacific, 37 F. Supp. 829 (N. D.
Calif. 1941).
31 Tex. Laws 1947, c. 132, TEx. ANN. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon 1925) art. 5154-b. For a
fuller discussion of this statute see BELi, LAWS REGULATINc LABOR UNIONS PASSED BY
50rH LEcISLATURE OF TEXAs (1947).
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Future social and economic developments will dictate the advis-
ability of legislation along this line.
Even in an authorized strike. where violence or other question-
able acts occur, the litigant may encounter formidable difficulties.
"Strikers may go to the very line between lawful and unlawful.'" 2
This line may well prove elusive and indistinct in many instances,
while only the injury remains unquestioned.
Although the plaintiff secures a judgment against the union, his
troubles are not ended. For this judgment to be of value, he must
first locate union property to be levied upon, not always an easy
task. The litigant is also confronted with the likelihood that his
judgment against a local union will not be binding upon the na-
tional organization." The plaintiff cannot guard against this pos-
sibility as it seems to be controlled by the internal organization of
the union. The situation is analogous to a parent and subsidiary
corporation. In some instances, however, service upon the local
may give jurisdiction over the national organization."'
Assuming that the plaintiff has a good cause of action with no
question of recovering on the judgment, the advisability of litiga-
tion should be considered. The desirability of maintaining friend-
ly relations with the union may well be a restraining factor where
an employer contemplates suit.
-Virgil T. Lester.
32 Great Northern Ry. Co. v. l.cal G. F. L. of I. A. of M., 283 Fed. 557 (D Montana
1922).
33 Christian v. International Assn. of Machinists, 7 F. (2d) 481 (E. D. Ky. 1925).
34 Operative Plasterers Assn. v. Case, 93 F. (2d) 56 (App. D. C. 1937).
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